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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant}
vs.
CLARENCE T. JONES and ED. H.
WATSON, State Engineer of the
State of Utah,

Case No. 7189

Defendants and Respondents

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Comes now the appellant and respectfully prays the
court to grant a rehearing of this cause on the following
grounds, namely:
1. The court has fallen into senous and fundamental

error in its statement that certain letters of the State Engineer
are the ((very foundation of this appeal, and the trial de novo
in the district court," whereas the appeal is founded on the
facts and their legal effect-the findings of fact, conclusions
of law and decree of the District Court, and neither the said
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letters or any part of them are either relevant or material in
any sense or degree whatever.
2. The court has fallen into fundamental error in holding

the decision controlled by the pronouncements of this court
in Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, 76 Utah
243, 289 P. 116, whereas they were stated as the effect of
a statute different from that in force at the time of and controlling in this cause.
3. The court has fallen into fundamental error in finding
that the waters in question are those within the scope of the
approved application 12144 of the United States and nevertheless holding them subject to appropriation by Respondent.
4. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental
error in holding that as between the owner of an approved
application for right to the use of water and a subsequent
applicant for right to use from the same source, the burden is
upon the one prior in time and right to establish interference or
conflict by the latter rather than the contrary as required by
Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 100, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
5. The court has fallen into s'erious and fundamental
error in holding, contrary to the former decisions of this court,
that one who seeks to appropriate water from or near the
source of supply of one with prior rights to use from that
source has not the burden of proving no interference.
6. The court has fallen into fundamental error in failing
and refusing to decide whether under the facts found and
before it a~d the issue so made and argued, the waters in
question are or are not the subject of appropriation.
7. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental
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error in stating, HThere are no vested rights with which this
application 'vill interfere-at least no such rights are called
to attention of the court,'' when as a matter of fact the attention
of the court was expressly called to the vested rights of the
United States tttotally irreconcilable with approval of the Jones
applications.''
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY,
Attorneys for Appellant.
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley, Attorneys for Appellant, and
D. A. Skeen, a member of the firm, do hereby certify that
in their opinion there is good reason to believe that the judgment of the court herein is erroneous and that the cause
ought to be re-examined. .
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY and
D. A. SKEEN.
Attorneys for Appellant.
I join in the foregoing application and certificate.
FISHER HARRIS,
Amicus Curiae
BRIEF
1.- The court has fallen into serious and fundamental

error in its statement that certain letters of the State
Engineer are the tcvery foundation of this appeal,
and the trial de novo in the district court," whereas
the appeal is founded on .the facts and their legal
effect-the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
decree of the District Court, and neither the said
letters or any part of them are either relevant
or material in any sense or degree whatever.
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The letter of the State Engineer, fifty-seven lines of which
are quoted in the opinion of the court, gives the reasons in
response to which he approved the Jones applications. But
this is not an appeal from the decision of the State Engineer;
this is an appeal from the decision of the Fourth District Court
which on appeal from the decision of the Engineer tried the
cause de novo, and even if that were not so-even if the cause
were now before the District Court the ((opinion" of the
Engineer would be of no more consequence-no more nearly
the ((very foundation of the case"-than the opinion of a
Justice of the Peace or Judge of a city court in a case on trial
de novo before the District Court.
The facts found to be such by the District Court, those
which are known by the court as such, its conclusions and
decree are the ((very foundation of this appeal," and neither
the letter quoted or any part of it is either relevant or material
in any sense or degree to the appeal.
What weight was given by this court to the letter quoted
from at considerable length cannot be objectively determined,
but it is necessarily inferable that it materially affected its
decision.
If it had been proper to notice and to comment upon
the letter of the Engineer it would have been appropriate
to notice and determine the effect of the fact that he, like the
trial court, gave no consideration to the rights of the United
States; both asserting in effect that which counsel for Respondent
Jones and the Attorney General again and again asserted
explicitly, namely that ((this is a private law suit between two
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small water users" and so that the interests and rights of the
ttDeer Creek Project, not only had not been considered, but
ought not to have been.
It was this which was characterized by Amicus Curire as
Hutterly and obviously frivolous,, he suggesting in response
that the case ought to be Hremanded in any event, so that,
at least, there shall be same approach to compliance with the
real essence of the law.''
2. The court has fallen into fundamental error in hold-

ing the decision controlled by the pronouncements
of this court in Little Cottonwood Water Company
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116, whereas they
were stated as the effect of a statute different from
that in force at the time of and controlling in this
cause.
In the first place, what was said in Little Cottonwood
Water Company vs. Kimball, and so often since, in relation to
the duties of the State Engineer, was pure dictum, for the court
having decided that water lost by seepage and evaporation from
an open ditch was the subject of appropriation by one who proposed to save it, there was a clear and indisputably affirmative
showing of unappropriated water, and there was no occasion
whatever for a lengthy or any dissertation at all upon the
duty of the Engineer in a doubtful case.
Passing that, however, the statute interpreted in the
majority opinion was of very different effect from that which is
applicable to the facts of this case.
The fact of this difference was called to the attention of
the court by Amicus Curiae in his original brief, page 11:
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((The statute makes it of the very essence of approval,
that there be found to be runappropriated water in the
proposed source,' and, whether before the State Engineer or the District Court, if there is nothing from
which that fact may be determined the application must
be rejected, for the sufficient and simple and compelling
reason that the fundamental prerequisite to approval
is lacking.
((The necessary implications of the statute are so obvious
that anything aditional must be superogatory; nevertheless it is significant that prior to amendment by
the legislature in 1939 Section 8 of Chapter 3, Title
100 read, (When there is no unappropriated water
in the proposed source of supply it shall be the duty
of the State Engineer to reject such application.' Then,
(Under the language of the statute' as Chief Justice
Cherry pointed out in Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball at page 248 of 76 Utah, (it is (was)
not a prerequisite to the approval of an application
that the State Engineer find affirmatively that there
is unappropriated water in the proposed source. The
proposition is stated in the negative, and it is only
when there is no unappropriated water in the proposed
source that the application is to be rejected.' It is
quite otherwise as the Legislature provided in 1939,
and, for reasons which will at once occur, far better."
The reasons which it is said ((will at once occur" are
these:
Prior to the amendment of the section the water resources
of the state being relatively undeveloped, it was proper that
applications for right to appropriate should be approved unless
there was showing of ((no unappropriated water in the proposed source,'' while since the date of the amendment, and
the occas1on for it, the fact has been that indiscriminate
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approval of applications has been more likely to disturb and
disrupt the exercise of rights already acquired rather than to
lead to further development of water resources.
No notice was taken by this court of what was said in
this regard, and so far as we know no notice has ever been
taken by this court of the fact and effect of the amendment
of Section 8 of Chapter 3 of Title 100 of the Code. Those
who. have been familiar with the course of legislation on the
subject, and who in some measure have influenced it, are
of course aware of the purpose of the amendment, but objectively its purpose is quite obvious. We submit that it unequivocally directs a different statement than that made by Chief
Justice Cherry in Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, and that it clearly directs a result the very opposite of that
announced by this court in the case of Lehi Irrigation Company
vs. Jones. The statute as amended will not permit in support of
its decision what the court said in this case: ((It is not clear that
there is no unappropriated water," for under the statute the
Jones applications may only be approved upon a finding that
there ((is unappropriated water in the proposed source."
3. The court has fallen into fundamental error in
finding that the waters in question are those within
the scope of the approved application 12144 of
the United States and nevertheless holding them
subject to appropriation by Respondent.
4. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental
error in holding that as between the owner of an
approved application for right to the use of water
and a subsequent applicant for right to use from the
same source, the burden is upon the one prior in
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time and right to establish interference or conflict
by the later rather than the contrary as required
by Section 3, Chapter 8, Title 10, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
5. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental
error in holding, contrary to the former decisions
of this court, that one who seeks to appropriate
water from or near the source of supply of one
with prior rights to use from that source has not
the burden of proving no interference.

These three assignments we think may be discussed as
one. The court has found that the exchange application No.
12144 of the United States filed with the State Engineer on
April 3, 1936, is before the court and that its effects must
be considered in relation to the applications in question. The
waters the subject of the Jones applications have been definitely
determined to be those covered by No. 12144, but this court,
approving the Jones applications nevertheless, has done so
on the theory that it is possible that the 30,000 acre feet
covered by the exchange application may be recovered .without
recourse to the springs arising by use of the Deer Creek water.
In other words, it has cast upon the United States the burden
of proving, in each instance, that the waters found to be
developed by its efforts are essential to the exercise of rights
granted to it more than 12 years ago to recover them.
In this it has ignored the effect of the statute referred to
and has held that as between the owner of an approved
application for right to the use of water and a subsequent
applicant for rights to use from the same source, the burden
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is upon the one prior in time and right to establish interference
or conflict, rather than the contrary. Not only is the result
in conflict with the clear purpose and effect of Section 8 of
Chapter 3 of Title 100, Utah Code .l\nnotated, 1943, but it
is in conflict with the rule in the analogous situations presented
by Peterson vs. Wood, 71 Utah 77, 262 P. 828; Bastian vs.
Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 U. 1092, and Mountain Lake
Mining Company vs. Midway Irrigation Company, 47 Utah
346, 149 P. 929, by which the burden of proof has been definitely placed upon him who seeks to appropriate water from
or near the source of supply of one with prior rights to use
from that source, to show by clear and convincing evidence
that there will be no interference.
The effect of thus shifting the burden of proof is such
as to make the rights of the United States under its application
12144 impossible of exercise, for in every case and whatever
the form of action might be, every claimant in the situation
of Jones would urge what this court has said in this case.
The result is utterly impracticable, as well as unconscionable against the prior right-unconscionable because there
is no equity in favor of the applicant in such case.
The waters in question result from an appropriation made
from a foreign watershed, and thus have been saved from
wastage into Great Salt Lake; they .have been stored in a
reservoir constructed to receive and store them; they have been
reduced to actual possession by the United States as an essential
part of the water supply of a great reclamation project. In
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practical effect they have been created. As early as 1936 the
United States gave notice that once used they would be recovered and re-used for the benefit of an essential part of
the water supply of the Provo River Project, serving some
50,000 acres of farm lands and substantially half of the
population of the State of Utah; and the State of Utah has
granted the United States the right to recover and reuse them,
and the right so granted has been confirmed by this court.
What this court has held and said in this case is totally incon·
sistent with and utterly destroys the effect of what was decided
in Tanner vs. Bacon, State Engineer, 103 Utah 494.
6. The court has fallen into fundamental error in
failing and refusing to decide whether under the
facts found and before it and the issue so made and
argued, the waters in question are or are not the
subject of appropriation.
(CWe are not prepared to render an adjudication upon
the record that is before us, and thus possibly determine
ultimate rights at this time, but will reserve these matters
until a proper case brings the issue before us . . . . We are
reluctant to decide so important a problem as an initial matter
without having the benefit of proceedings, arguments and
parties, who may be adversely affected, to aid us in its determination.''
Amicus Curire in his final brief, after reciting the facts,
said this: tel£ those facts are of no legal effect noticeable upon
application to appropriate the waters so realized, how can
this court avoid saying so? And if they are-if under those
facts those waters are not subject to appropriation without
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showing abandonment by their creator, ho"v can this court
avoid saying that?'·'
The court has answered these questions very simply and
clearly by saying in effect: n\Ve accomplish the avoidance
of these questions by declining to consider them.'' This
<:luestion is reserved nuntil a proper case brings the issue before
us."
The issue is clearly before the court now, and in a case
as ttproper" and appropriate as it is possible to conceive. The
fact that the waters sought to be appropriated by Jones have
been brought from a foreign watershed. and that they are the
result of the use of those waters from storage in a reservoir
constructed to impound them, has been found as a fact by
the trial court. The facts are indisputably established and
their legal effect has been asserted on one side and controverted
on the other.
How can this or any other matter, important or not, be
decided other than ccinitially"? The court already has ((the
benefit of proceedings." It already has the ((arguments;"
and it has before it the ((parties who may be adversely affected.''
As to ((parties who may be adversely affected," as we
have pointed out before, there is no other party, certainly ?Ot
Respondent Jones, in behalf of whom any equity may be urged.
The only matter to be determined is whether or not the fruits
of the labor of others-in the last analysis the fruits of the
labor of the stockholders and beneficiaries of the Provo River
Water Users Association and of the United States, are to be
conferred upon a stranger. This court either agrees or disagrees
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with what was said by the federal court in United States vs.
Haga, 276 Fed. 41, and approved by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Ide vs. United States, 263 U. S. 497, that
the result advocated here by Appellant and by Amicus Curire
is directed by ttConsiderations of both public policy and natural
justice."
As a matter of fact this Court has already decided, and
the State Engineer has already decided, that which this Court
has said in this cause it is reluctant to decide.
Approval of Application No. 12144 necessarily involved
a determination of the State Engineer that the right to the
use of the water the subject of the application belonged
to the United States; and such a determination was also
implicit in the decision of the State Engineer, the decision of
the District Court and in the decjsion of this Court in Tanner
vs. State Engineer, 103 Utah 494, for prerequisite to the right
of exchange is the right to the use of the waters exch~nged.
The right of exchange exists as to no waters whatever except
those already appropriated.
The result is that the principles, the foundation of the decisions of Ide vs. U. S. and U. S. vs. Haga, sufficient in themselves
to affirm the rights of the United States, totally irreconcilable
with approval of the Jones' applications, have long since been
affirmed by the State Engineer and by this Court; but this
Court in Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones, in approving the
Jones' applications, while declining to pass on the question,
has in effect passed upon it in an effect the very opposite
to its fanner decision, saying at the same time that the Jones'
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rights are dependent upon tne iilings of the United States
and that he ttmust rely" upon then1, Hto secure at least a part,

if not all, of the water upon which he has filed.''
If it be true that the matter has not been argued sufficiently
extensively, that claim may be obviated by the granting of this
petition for rehearing, directed as it is on grounds independent
of this question.
7. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental
error in stating, nThere are no vested rights with

which this application will interfere-at least no
such rights are called to attention of the court,"
when as a matter of fact the attention of the court
was expressly called to the vested rights of the
United States ((totally irreconcilable with approval
of the Jones' application."
We are unable to understand what the court has in mind
unless some peculiar significance attaches to the word ((vested."
Are we to infer that the right of the United States as the
creator of the waters in question is .not vested, or that its rights
under Application 12144 are not?

If the latter is intended,

it ought to have been said in the year 1943 in Tanner vs.
Bacon, in which event the Provo River Project would probably
have been abandoned.

Instead of which, and in reliance

upon the decision of this court and its necessary implications,
some twenty millions of dollars has been expended in the
construction of works utterly useless if the fundamental water
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rights of the project are not vested-are subject to the jeopardy
of such encroachments as are countenanced and encouraged
by the decision of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones.
It is respectfully and earnestly submitted that this cause
ought to be re·examined.
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY
Attorneys for Appellant
FISHER HARRIS
Amicus Curiae
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